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Abstract—Blockchains – with their inherent properties of
transaction transparency, distributed consensus, immutability
and cryptographic verifiability – are increasingly seen as a means
to underpin innovative products and services in a range of sectors
from finance through to energy and healthcare. Discussions, too
often, make assertions that the trustless nature of blockchain tech-
nologies enables and actively promotes their suitability—there
being no need to trust third parties or centralised control. Yet
humans need to be able to trust systems, and others with whom
the system enables transactions. In this paper, we highlight that
understanding this need for trust is critical for the development
of blockchain-based systems.
Through an online study with 125 users of the most well-
known of blockchain based systems – the cryptocurrency Bitcoin
– we uncover that human and institutional aspects of trust are
pervasive. Our analysis highlights that, when designing future
blockchain-based technologies, we ought to not only consider
computational trust but also the wider eco-system, how trust
plays a part in users engaging/disengaging with such eco-systems
and where design choices impact upon trust. From this, we distill
a set of guidelines for software engineers developing blockchain-
based systems for societal applications.
Keywords-Blockchain, Trust, Bitcoin, Guidelines
I. INTRODUCTION
It is not uncommon to hear discussions of how blockchains
will revolutionize everything from banking to security in the
Internet of Things (IoT), from the press to government, often
with the presumption that the transparency of an accessible
ledger will promote, engender or increase trust in the applicable
industry. By design, blockchains are distributed throughout
peers in a network with whom validation of new records (or
blocks) is required before they are added to the public chain.
When a new block is added it contains a hash – a unique
fingerprint – of the previous block. Each new addition, therefore,
being immutable, cannot be changed. In addition to being
distributed, blockchains have a decentralized governance model
meaning that no single party can approve additions to the chain,
nor can they make unilateral changes to the technology of
blockchain.
It is this combination of architectural design choices, and
the distributed and decentralized nature which differentiates
blockchain-based systems from more classically centralized
systems, and consequently leads many to believing that
blockchains present a potential silver-bullet for a range of
societal applications from finance and energy to healthcare
and open government, e.g., [1]–[5].
Whilst it may be the case that blockchain will revolutionize
these sectors, it is highly unlikely that unless people trust
implementations that they will be adopted, be used, provide
stakeholder returns or engender loyalty [6]—let alone deliver
on those original promises.
As yet there are limited real-world, and successful, imple-
mentations [7] from which we can understand how humans
will trust such solutions. One area in which blockchains are
well understood is that of crypto-currency. Whilst it seems a
new crypto-currency appears every week, Bitcoin1 provides a
prototypical use-case for blockchain within which the impact
of design decisions upon trust can be explored. This, in turn,
can guide design choices for other blockchain-based systems
so that they account for, engender and facilitate human trust.
We studied a group of 125 Bitcoin users, as a proxy for users
of blockchain-based systems, and found prevalent expressions
of interpersonal trust. The novel contributions of our work are:
• Clear evidence that, despite traditional viewpoints of the
trust in blockchain being solely in computation, trust in
other people is a critical concern for users.
• Discussion of how trust can be impacted positively (and
negatively) by the technical choices made in the design
and maintenance of Bitcoin.
• Design guidelines that articulate how these aspects of trust
will occur, and need to be accounted for, in the design of
future blockchain-based systems and applications.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II
provides background on literature on interpersonal trust and
the need to study such notions in the context of blockchain-
based systems. Section III offers an overview of Bitcoin as
the prototypical (and most widely deployed) blockchain and
discusses whether trustless is a term truly applicable to such
an eco-system. Sections IV and V, respectively, describe the
study methodology and the measures & constructs used to
1Nomenclature. Based upon community norms, the uppercase form ‘Bit-
coin,’ is used to refer to the Bitcoin ecosystem including the protocol. A
lowercase ‘b’ written as ‘bitcoin’ is usually associated specifically with bitcoin
as the currency.
analyze trust. Section VI discusses aspects of interpersonal
trust uncovered by our study while Section VII highlights the
impact of loss upon trust. Section VIII reflects on two of our
guidelines following the Bitfinex hack that occurred after the
completion of our study. Section IX contrasts our study with
related work and Section X concludes the paper and identifies
directions for future work.
II. BACKGROUND: INTERPERSONAL TRUST
Trust is often defined as being empirically based and
probabilistic: “to a degree consistent with our perception of the
available evidence. In human interaction, we trust individuals
and institutions to the degree that they have, over time, proved
trustworthy” [8]. Similarly, Mayer et al [9] argue that any
such trust is cyclically developed based upon the trustor’s
perception of the other party and their own propensity to trust,
and that without both factors trust cannot exist. Thusly, trust
is contextual to the trusting party.
Trust also lies at the core of almost all theories of interper-
sonal relationships [10]. There are few aspects of life within
which trust does not play an indispensable role – trust pervades
human society [11], [12]. Kramer and Carnevale [13] argue that
trust involves a set of beliefs and expectations that another’s
actions will be in some way beneficial to long term self-interest;
a position that could only be established were the trustor able to
cognitively assess another person’s (or organization’s) actions
from an empathetic perspective.
Within a blockchain an emergent notion of trustlessness
comes from its practical use as a pseudonymous peer-to-peer
based network. Once a transaction has been logged within the
blockchain it is known to everyone, in the network, that it has
been concluded. Consequently, there is no need to trust, or
even know, who a counter-party is when transacting.
However this view is problematic in that it only caters
for the payment side of a transaction and in no way affords
guarantee that the goods or services being purchased will
actually be delivered. That is still utterly dependent upon trust
or third party assurity [14]. This, in turn, requires institutional
trust from the users, which may be underpinned by a form
of centralized control, such as regulation [6]. With people
needing to mitigate risk by placing trust in something beyond
computation alone, services like escrow and smart contracts
built around the blockchain fill the void – and incidentally also
act as as explicit statements of mistrust within which precise
terms for an expectation of service and remedial action are
articulated for the avoidance of doubt.
It follows that, as new uses emerge for blockchain technolo-
gies, the ecosystem is evolving not to remove centrality or the
need to trust a governing institution but rather to cater for a
very human need to be able to understand and remove risk in
everyday life – to be able to see certainty in outcomes.
III. BITCOIN - A PROTOTYPICAL BLOCKCHAIN
Conceptually Bitcoin was a product of its time. By the late
2000s intrusive organizational demands for personal data were
being recognized and world economies were in the early stages
of incredible decline. The indiscretions of financial institutions
were laid bare for all to see and it was apparent that a great
many people were going to suffer loss in the years to come.
Mistrust of the handling of this crisis by financial institutions,
central banks and governments was growing. In a period of
such uncertainty and, arguably, fear it was very easy to view
this as being an opportunity for an alternative approach to the
hitherto centrally regulated payment channels.
Whilst Riegelsberger et al [15] argue that systems should
promote trustworthy behavior, when first proposed—as an
alternative payments system—the intention for Bitcoin was to
remove the need for trust altogether. Trust, in these parties,
was viewed as a necessary evil in traditional economics, borne
out of the need to mitigate inherent risks where bad actors
exist in a system. Nakamoto argued that this was leading to
organizations “hassling” customers for “more information than
they would otherwise need”, the implication being that this
was in some way a form of risk mitigation against customer’s
potentially fraudulent behaviors.
By design, Bitcoin is intended to be trustworthy by actually
being trustless in those very persons or organizations that one
may mistrust.
The term trustless was coined by an early adopter
community with a converged world-view and, for many in and
around Bitcoin, this purist view of trustless remains, i.e., the
trust model for payments is “based in computation rather than
people” [16]. But Bitcoin has evolved beyond payments alone,
into a more socio-technical ecosystem; new use cases have
emerged (e.g., investment speculation, gambling, laundering,
digital asset signing, etc.) and the community around it has
grown. And organizations, decentralized or not, including
mining pools, exchanges, wallet providers and product/service
vendors all need trust in order to cooperate, negotiate and
transact [17].
Truly Trustless? The crypto-trust that underpins Bitcoin is
essential in securing the whole ecosystem but, in this evolved
environment it seems a little narrow to view Bitcoin as being
totally trustless. Not least as with all technologies relied upon
to secure assets (informational or otherwise), people (i.e.,
software engineers) are responsible for design, implementation
and operation of these technological tools. As Lacey [18]
points out “despite the presence of advanced technical controls,
information systems remain vulnerable because of human
behavior” – something which Bitcoin’s inception was designed
to actively mitigate against and is being discussed as a prime
reason for adopting blockchain. Yet cases of miscreant and
inadvertent detrimental behavior within Bitcoin abound.
IV. STUDY METHODOLOGY
Our on-line study sought to understand if and in whom
bitcoin users placed trust, contrary to the trustless nature of
Bitcoin itself. The study was reviewed and approved by the
relevant institutional research ethics committee. It was widely
advertised to a number of Bitcoin and research-participant
related on-line forums, websites, social media and also through
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BitCoinTalk 5 5 5 3 1 5 4 - -
Unknown 5 4 3 3 - 1 - 1 1
Email 1 1 - - - - - 1 -
Facebook 1 - - - - - - - -
StackExchange 1 1 1 1 - - 1 - -
Total 125 94 81 65 3 67 42 8 7
TABLE I: Bitcoin usage by survey respondent source
direct email asking for voluntary participation with no offer of
payment. A summary of the main sources of respondents, and
their own personal uses of bitcoin, can be seen in Table I.
The study asked a number of questions2 looking at:
1) participant demographics,
2) personality type,
3) discovery and use of the crypto-currency,
4) general sentiment towards Bitcoin and its long-term
prospects, and
5) loss events.
These questions allowed us to examine aspects of trust within
Bitcoin, in particular looking for interpersonal trust in other
users and those developing / maintaining bitcoin, institutional
trust in the exchanges being used to trade bitcoin, and
technological trust in Bitcoin itself. From these we can draw
insights as to how design decisions, for other blockchain-based
technologies, may impact on user trust.
A. Demographics
In total 181 responded to the invitation with fifty-six
excluded from the analysis for either not having completed
the questionnaire or for bogus participation, such as making
offensive or spam comments in response to open ended
questions. Respondents were allowed to only participate once
(enforced by client-side cookie and server-side IP registration)
with the ability to take the study in stages over a maximum of
five days in total.
Of the qualified responses (N=125), overwhelmingly 88% of
respondents were male. Sixty-seven percent of all respondents
considered themselves ‘employed’ with another 26% ‘still in
education.’ Eighty-eight percent were located in either Europe
(n = 68) or the Americas (North & South) (n = 42).
B. Bitcoin
Exposure to Bitcoin amongst respondents peaked in 2012-
2013 with 86% having heard of Bitcoin prior to the collapse in
pricing of early 2014. Amongst respondents, on-line discussion
forums provided first exposure for 43%, with friends/family
member/colleagues and on-line news websites accounting for
2A condensed copy of the study questions can be found in the Appendix
another 41%. Ninety-four (94) respondents expressed how
they have or are using Bitcoin. Of those: purchasing or
selling things was the most prevalent use (86%) followed
by investment/speculation (71%).
Whilst only 9% of the 125 respondents agreed that Bitcoin
was primarily being used for criminal activity, 36% felt theft
was hampering Bitcoin’s adoption. Three respondents admitted
to having used Bitcoin to launder money themselves.
V. MEASURES & CONSTRUCTS
A. Interpersonal Trust
We directly extracted each respondent’s levels of inter-
personal trust in other Bitcoin users (TU ) and the people
maintaining Bitcoin (TD) – each determined through a single
five-point Likert response and represented in Figure 1.
B. Propensity to trust
The NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) [19] looks
to define the “Big Five” personality domains of neuroti-
cism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness
and conscientiousness. Taken together, the five domains with
their underlying thirty facets (or sub-traits) are viewed as
a “comprehensive and detailed assessment of normal adult
personality.” Within this study we look to the domain of
agreeableness which is a personality trait where a low score
relates to selfish behaviors and lack of empathy. Congruent
with Lucassen & Schraagen [20] we do not apply the full
NEO-PI-R questionnaire as other traits (and sub-traits) are not
relevant to this study, choosing to only apply sub-trait questions
for propensity to trust. Respondents answered 8 questions (see
Appendix) as to how much they felt the statements applied to
themselves, with the total sum of results being used to assign
a score to the respondent (TP ). The construct TP allows us to
approximate whether levels of both interpersonal or information
trust may be the result of this underlying personality type.
C. Sentiment towards Bitcoin
Sentiment towards Bitcoin was measured using 6 questions
(see Appendix) about aspects of Bitcoin: price rises, adoption,
regulation, viability as a currency, investment potential and
criminal activity. The total sum of results was used to assign
a sentiment score to the respondent (S). The construct S
allows us to approximate whether a respondent’s underlying
sentiment (positive or negative) to Bitcoin might influence
interpersonal or information trust ratings.
A summary of constructs (TP & S) can be seen in Table II.
D. Construct Validity
For the two constructs (TP & S), questions used a five-point
Likert scale where 1 = ‘strongly disagree’ and 5 = ‘strongly
agree’. Cronbach’s Alpha (α) was used to test the internal
reliability of each construct. As a function of the number of
items in a test, it measures the co-variance between item-pairs
in a construct and the variance of the total score, and is a
commonly used statistical method for estimating the reliability
of a psychometric test. As such α can be viewed as the
expected correlation that tests measure the same construct. For
example the construct TP had 8 questions, each being an item.
In psychometric testing, common “rule-of-thumb” minimum
acceptable requirements for internal reliability are α ≥ 0.7.
Respondent’s propensity to trust (TP ) had a Cronbach’s α of
0.81 indicating good reliability in the questions as an indicator
of trust. Sentiment (S) had a Cronbach’s α of 0.70 indicating
acceptable reliability.
E. Influence Upon Constructs
Overall, respondents were moderately trusting in general
(mean = 27, standard deviation = 5.1) with a positive sentiment
towards Bitcoin (mean = 21, standard deviation = 4.3).
Testing for statistical dependence between these constructs and
when the respondent discovered Bitcoin was assessed using
Pearson’s Chi Squared tests. This determines the statistical
likelihood of any observed difference between two categorical
sets might be to chance. Simply, Pearson’s Chi Squared tests
whether when a respondent discovered Bitcoin impacts upon
their sentiment (S) towards Bitcoin. Slightly surprisingly, no
significant relationship to S was observed, meaning that how
long a respondent had known about Bitcoin was not influencing
their sentiment.
VI. EVIDENCE OF INTERPERSONAL TRUST
A. Trust in other users (TU )
The common view of Bitcoin is that its model of trust lays
solely within computation - that there is no need to trust people.
Overall, across the 125 respondents, trust in other users (TU )
was just below neutral (mean TU = 2.928, standard deviation
= 0.805) indicating a very slight mistrust in others, which
thusly does not seem particularly surprising.
However, participants were more than willing to express
notions of interpersonal trust in other users of Bitcoin. Given
this seeming disparity with doctrine, we looked to whether
a respondent’s propensity to trust (TP ) or their sentiment
towards Bitcoin itself might be influencing that slight mistrust.
A visual inspection of the influence of respondent’s personal
propensity to trust (TP ) and sentiment towards Bitcoin (S)
upon their trust in other users can be seen in Figure 1 A & B.
From this it actually appears that, whilst the mean response is
slightly mistrusting, actually trust in other people increases with
both underlying personality traits and their sentiment towards
Bitcoin.
Using ordinal logistic regression we tested the null hypothesis
that neither TP or S had no influence, and found that only
sentiment could be shown to significantly influence trust in
other users of Bitcoin at a 95% confidence level. This is a
surprising finding as one might well expect a positive sentiment
to follow doctrine and decrease trust.
B. Trust in people (software engineers) maintaining Bitcoin
(TD)
Whilst the distributed team of developers charged with
the ongoing maintenance and upkeep of Bitcoin (the core
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Fig. 1: Trust in people (TU & TD) against
Trust propensity (TP ) and Sentiment (S)
development team) can be argued to form an organization
with centralized control [21], [22], respondents (rightly) still
viewed this group as people and expressed trust there also.
This can be seen in Figure 1 C & D. Unlike users, we had
expected to find respondents more trusting of the developers.
Especially as they can only act with agreement and so a form
of peer consensus could be also viewed as a precursor for
them being viewed as trustworthy. This was initially confirmed
with trust in developers (TD) being above neutral indicating a
slight trust (mean TD = 3.064, standard deviation = 0.905).
Unlike user trust, using ordinal logistic regression, we found
that trust in developers was significantly influenced by both
propensity to trust and sentiment – more so when combined.
Guideline #1 - Interpersonal Trust Impacts on Adoption
Given that, even within a slightly mistrusting Bitcoin
community, interpersonal trust is still prevalent we
would expect the same to be true of any blockchain
implementation. Whilst it may be that trust in other
users may not be a prime concern, trust in those building
and maintaining such solutions will be—a position
supported by Zarifis et al [17] in that a user’s “level
of trust in a technology is an important factor in the
level of its adoption”.
C. Trust is Dependent
Using a manual open-coding approach to classify
respondents’ reasons for how and why they rated their
trust in other people using Bitcoin, we identified that user
Propensity for Trust (TP ) Sentiment towards Bitcoin (S)
Category Score % Score %
Very high 36-40 3.2% 26-30 15.2%
High 31-35 24.8% 21-25 44.0%
Moderate / Neutral 20-30 68.0% 16-20 32.0%
Low 13-19 3.2% 11-15 8.0%
Very Low 8-12 0.8% 6-10 0.8%
100% (N=125) 100% (N=125)
Mean score TP = 27, SD = 5.1 S = 21, SD = 4.3
(category = moderate) (category = positive)
TABLE II: Summary of constructs
behavior was a critical factor in trusting/mistrusting other users.
Context - A number of respondents did allude to interpersonal
trust being context specific. For example, trusting a ‘bricks
and mortar’ vendor selling books for small amounts of bitcoin
might require a different assessment of trust compared to, say,
a person peddling drugs on a Dark Web marketplace.
Sentiment - The role of sentiment towards Bitcoin appears to
be critical in how respondents assess other people. It is unclear
as to why this might be the case although there is perhaps
a key difference in the roles that ‘other users’ and ‘people
maintaining Bitcoin’ play – especially in terms of interaction
with respondents.
As respondents (in the majority) were also users of bitcoin
it is likely they had had numerous cyclical interactions in
similar contexts (multiple discussions across different forums
for example) with ‘other users’—sufficient to generate trust
judgments. The same is not necessarily true of interactions with
‘people maintaining Bitcoin.’ This core development team is
generally well known throughout the Bitcoin community with
members regularly being called upon by news agencies and
conferences to pass comment or judgment on various crypto-
currency aspects. But these one-way interactions (i.e., the
respondent is consuming information from a core development
person) are different to that of the two-way interactions within
an active discussion.
So whilst trust in ‘other users’ may be linked to those prior
interactions, it seems plausible (given the critical role the core
development team play in maintaining Bitcoin) that a positive
sentiment towards Bitcoin (S) may be acting as some form of
proxy for that missing interaction when making judgment on
what are a distant non-interacting party.
Mistrust - A little over 25% of reasons related to the behavior
of other users, particularly behaviors that might be either
criminal or in some way manipulative. The behaviors of other
users (e.g., fraud, theft or market manipulation) were cited
by several respondents as rationale for trust judgments – in
the main mistrust. It is unclear from the data collected if
these judgments were based on single, perceived, vicarious or
repeated (cyclical) experiences. Respondents citing behavior
did exhibit slightly below average scores for trust in other users
(TU ) and a slightly negative sentiment (S) and it is possible
these contribute to the rationale. Without specifically asking
for qualification from respondents, this is conjecture. That said,
with behavior of others applied as a rationale for trust this
reinforces that interpersonal trust is evident in Bitcoin.
Guideline #2 - Interpersonal Trust Will Provide Re-
silience Against Loss of Trust Through Errant Behavior
It is almost impossible to use technology to mitigate
human behaviors, especially those that might be in
some way subversive or adversarial. What is clear is
that perceptions of negative behavior on the part of
others impact trust. We would expect that where trust in
those building and maintaining the blockchain can be
engendered – perhaps through ongoing engagement
with user groups – then trust in blockchain-based
systems and services is likely to be more resilient
to the inevitable miscreant events they will endure.
VII. THE IMPACT OF LOSS UPON TRUST
Amongst all the stories of fantastical price rises are almost
as many tales of people losing bitcoin. From the unfortunate
loss of a hard-drive containing 7,500 bitcoins in late 2013 to
a landfill site [23] through to the widely publicized collapse
of the exchange Mt.Gox in early 2014, most likely from the
alledged theft of 600-800,000 bitcoin.
Such losses impact upon trust. Of the respondents who
claimed to have or being using Bitcoin (N = 94), 62.4% felt
they have incurred a loss of Bitcoin (see Table III). Forty-five
respondents gave details as to how they had lost bitcoin and
rated on a five point Likert scale how this loss had impacted
upon their interpersonal trust in Bitcoin users (TU ) and, in
the people maintaining Bitcoin (TD). The impacts of loss
(mean TU = 2.689 & mean TD = 2.911) both indicated that
interpersonal trust was slightly reduced when losing Bitcoin.
Moving slightly away from interpersonal trust briefly; we
also looked at whether loss impacts upon a general trust in
Bitcoin (TB) and, in Bitcoin exchanges (TE). Whilst loss had
no mean impact upon trust in Bitcoin (mean TB = 3.000) there
was a more marked reduction in trust of the exchanges (mean
TE = 2.489).
When we look at individual types of loss we can see a
more nuanced impact with trust being, in the main, negatively
Mean Impact on Trust After Loss* Significant Impacts Upon Party
Reason for Loss n TU TD TB TE Party ChiSq (x2) DF p
Fraud 18 2.444 3.000 3.056 2.222 - - - -
Exchange Collapse 18 2.778 2.778 2.833 1.889 TE 24.058 3 0.000
Rate Variations 12 2.583 2.667 2.667 2.167 TE 7.878 3 0.049
User Error 11 2.727 3.091 3.273 3.000 TE 12.419 3 0.006
Theft 8 2.375 2.750 2.875 1.875 TU 7.805 3 0.050
TE 7.879 3 0.049
Exchange Problems 5 2.600 2.400 2.400 1.600 TD 9.056 3 0.029
TE 13.715 3 0.003
TB 9.562 4 0.048
Other 4 2.750 2.750 3.000 3.000 - - - -
Gambling 2 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.000 TU 22.213 3 0.000
TB 10.334 4 0.035
(Notes: *where 1=“much lower” 2=“lower” 3=“about same” 4=“higher” 5=“much higher”)
TABLE III: Impacts of loss upon trust
impacted by loss. Interpersonal trust (TU ) is most negatively
impacted by fraud and theft events. Non-interpersonal trust
tends to remain reasonably stable. However, trust in exchanges
(TE) suffers markedly through both technical problems at
exchanges (mean of 1.600 indicating much lower / lower) and
collapse of an exchange (mean of 1.889 indicating lower).
Interestingly trust in the people maintaining Bitcoin (TD) was
most negatively impacted by loss from technical problems at
exchanges, something for which they have no direct, and little
(if any) indirect responsibility.
Pearson’s Chi-Squared tests of impact of loss (by reason)
against these four parties show significant results—the most
notable being TE being pegged to the collapse of exchanges,
and TU being pegged to gambling.
A. Gamblers trust more
Whilst gambling is fully related to TU , it appears that
loss from gambling actually increases trust across all four
parties. Some caution is applied to this finding as this context
sample size was only two — however we posit that, as an
often repeated behavior, gambling actually fulfills the cyclical
pattern of interactions. A key issue in trusting within gambling
is fairness. If one player has lost, but s/he does not suspect
the game is rigged or the other party is cheating, any loss
would not likely reduce their trust, as some loss is an essential
element of gambling and thus expected. Further the acceptance
of bitcoin as a payment method on gambling websites may
demonstrate a desirable level of technical prowess which,
when combined with a consistency in aspects such as reliable
payment of winnings, helps to engender or even bolster trust.
B. Fraud does not reduce trust in Bitcoin, but theft does
Finally there are notable differences in impact between
fraud and theft events. Both are behaviors undertaken by other
parties but it appears respondents view them differently. For
example, fraud has negligible impact upon TD & TB and its
greatest impact upon TE . For theft the impact is across the
board, again with the most pronounced being upon TE . In
both cases it appears that other users might be perceived to be
to blame for the loss and that exchanges may in fact shoulder
greater blame (again perhaps these reports pertain to the huge
losses incurred by many in early 2014). The lack of impact on
TD & TB through fraud appears to suggest that theses parties
are not viewed as being at fault, however the same is not true
in theft events – something that may hint at concerns about
underlying security issues in Bitcoin.
C. Self enacted loss can increase trust
Where respondents were able to attribute loss to their own
failings (user error) it reduced TU , the reasons for which are
unclear. A common theme for ‘user error’ was lost wallets,
keys or passwords. An increase in TD & TB might be linked
to this personal error reinforcing underpinning concepts of
security within Bitcoin wallets.
An equally plausible scenario is based in economic funda-
mentals which dictates how the relationship between supply
and demand will impact upon price. For example, as supply in
oil decreases, given a stable demand, the price will increase.
Conversely a drop in demand and increase in supply will
drop prices. For anyone with a belief in these fundamentals
and knowing there is limited supply of bitcoin (the hard
limit of 21 million), any loss of bitcoin would result in the
value of retained bitcoin actually increasing—a process which
would reinforce foundational notions of decentralization and
(institutional) trustlessness.
Two key areas of system design that directly impact upon
user trust related to the loss of bitcoin are: transaction
confirmation and pseudonymity. It is all but impossible to
reverse erroneous transactions in Bitcoin. This is a result of
the design choice to not mandate multi-signatory transactions
(which are facilitated by the protocols) where at least two
of the confirmations are made by the transacting parties and
the casting vote is made by a third party in the event of
disagreement. As confirmations are left open to peers on the
network, confirmations are blind to transaction fulfillment, and
the loss of bitcoin due to fraudulent or theft events is permanent.
Further, the pseudonomity afforded in Bitcoin means that
attempts to recover losses via mechanisms such as legal action
are at best unlikely.
Guideline #3 - Protocol Choices can Both Improve and
Degrade Trust
In future blockchain implementations, understanding
how properties of the protocol can lead to unintentional
consequence will be critical, not just for user trust
and adoption, but also long term viability. Attempts
to facilitate removal of, or even thwart erroneous
blocks being written to the blockchain (possibly through
alternative consensus mechanisms such as proof-of-
stake [24]) need to be considered not just for their
technical capability but also how such mechanisms
might be perceived and trusted/mis-trusted by users.
D. Exchange collapses impact all aspects of trust
Thusly, it should come as no surprise that trust in exchanges,
people and Bitcoin itself is impacted negatively by loss events.
In an ecosystem where loss through fraud and theft is widely
publicized, the knowledge that the transfer of one’s bitcoins is
one-way is perceived as a huge trust issue by potential users,
with potential to hamper mainstream adoption.
Trust in exchanges (TE) suffers the most as a result of
technical problems or a collapse of the exchange itself. Given
the high profile collapse of Mt Gox in early 2014 and the
widespread technical problems it and other exchanges endured
in the weeks prior, this is not surprising. The more interesting
insight is these technical problems or collapses negatively
impact all four measured areas TU , TD, TB and TE .
Guideline #4 - Highly Visible Failures Impact Everyone
It is perhaps facile to point out that nobody wants their
implementation of a blockchain-based system to fail. It
is fair though to envisage multiple competing offerings
in the early stages as with crypto-currencies in general.
But what designers should understand is that when
one system fails, all systems are tarred with the same
brush—everyone is subject to a dent in how much users
trust the more generic technology. Expecting, and even
planning, for how to react to such events should be
standard practice. One possible solution lays within
Guideline #2 above, in more fully engaging with user
communities so that strengthened interpersonal trust
of those behind the technology helps to mitigate the
wider impact of failure upon trust.
VIII. POST-STUDY REFLECTION OF BITFINEX HACK
A. The breach
On August, 2nd 2016 Bitfinex — the largest (by volume)
exchange at the time — was hacked [25], resulting in a loss
of ∼US$70M worth of bitcoin and being the largest single
loss since the collapse of MT Gox in 2014. As news broke,
the velocity of the already falling price of bitcoin increased,
with closing prices having fallen ∼17% to under US$500. In
the immediate aftermath press coverage was largely negative
with many predicting another full exchange collapse. However
Bitfinex, recognising the potential impact of the negative press
in conjunction with significant financial loss, reacted swiftly
and released almost daily press announcements about the event.
B. The response
On August, 6th Bitfinex posted details of a recovery plan
in which losses would be generalized (socialized) across all
depositors - a 36.067% ‘haircut’ - by way of a $1 bond-like
security (‘BFX’ token) for later redemption, “we are crediting
a token labelled BFX to record each customer’s discrete losses.
Tokens will be distributed without release or waiver. The BFX
tokens will remain outstanding until redeemed in full by Bitfinex
or possibly exchanged upon the creditor’s request and Bitfinex’s
acceptance for shares of iFinex Inc.” [26]. This was a clear
indication by Bitfinex, and their parent company iFinex, that
they not only intended to keep trading but also to make good
on those losses, and could readily be interpreted as an exercise
in re-building customer and market trust.
The announcements updating customers, now creditors,
continued over the following weeks, detailing how breach
investigations were proceeding, how BFX redemptions were
being made and when tokens were being converted at scale
into equity as promised.
C. The ‘effect’
Exactly how users viewed this breach is unclear. For
some the attack may have been viewed as theft, decreasing
interpersonal trust. For others, Bitfinex may have been viewed
as institutionally untrustworthy. For some it is possible that as
the underlying protocols were not overtly viewed as being at
fault and trust in Bitcoin itself might have actually increased.
What is likely from this study’s findings is that trust will have
been impacted across all parties (TU , TD, TB & TE). In all
cases, however, this supports this study’s view that the trust
model of Bitcoin—as an evolving ecosystem—goes beyond
computation alone.
Given this, the efforts by Bitfinex to restore confidence
seem well placed, and support Guidelines #2 & #4. A visual
inspection of average bitcoin pricing [27] across multiple
exchanges (as this flattens out the more direct impact on
Bitfinex-only pricing) shows that post-breach the velocity of
price rises actually increased, and the decline in volume eased
(see Figure 2). Whilst Bitfinex’s actions cannot be proven to
be causal — without both statistical and user confirmation —
when the timings of their announcements are superimposed
(with the exception of A,F & H) each was followed within
a day by a rise in price, albeit a slight one. Announcements
F & H also pre-date similar rises but with greater lag of
approximately 2 to 3 days.
IX. RELATED WORK
Existing research on blockchain technologies predominantly
focuses on Bitcoin and on four key streams therein.
Fig. 2: Impact of Bitfinex security breach and subsequent recovery efforts on bitcoin markets
The first stream looks at the technology and its functionality
of the currency and its protocols e.g., [17], [28], [29]. The
second stream studies the security, privacy and stability of
the wider Bitcoin ecosystem, e.g., [21], [30]–[33]. The third
stream considers economic, e.g., [34]–[39] and governance,
e.g., [40]–[43] factors. The fourth stream, more recently and
adjunct to Bitcoin, looks at alternative uses (primarily) for
blockchains or distributed ledger technology (DLT) as it is
becoming known, e.g., [44]–[46].
Work examining the human dimensions of trust and how
they impact the adoption and usage of blockchains is limited.
Maurer, Nelms & Swartz [47] attribute social (interpersonal)
trust to the distributed nature of peers and code that underpin
Bitcoin. Lustig & Nardi [48] and Christoper [41] explore the
nature of trust in the algorithms. Zarifis et al [17] build a model
for transactional trust within business to consumer relationships.
Works by Sas and Khairuddin [49]–[51], through small-scale
user studies, explore user perceptions and trust from a Human
Computer Interactions (HCI) perspective and acknowledge
the “lack of empirical work exploring the experience of using
Bitcoin and the issues of trust surrounding it.”
Thusly, understanding human behavior – and more specifi-
cally concepts of trust (as is the focus of this paper) – helps
shape the software engineering community’s understanding of
the main barriers to mass adoption of blockchain-based systems.
This understanding is critical to the design, implementation
and maintenance choices being made, as well as the impacts
of loss events and media exposure upon user perceptions
and sentiments towards that system. This also bears close
relationship to the emerging body of work on values in software
engineering [52], [53]; user trust is a key value in blockchain-
based systems that are being proposed for delivery of critical
services such as finance, energy and healthcare.
X. CONCLUSIONS
It is with no small irony that, despite Nakamoto’s intention
to remove the need for trust in third-parties [54], Bitcoin is
replete with interpersonal trust. Indeed, without such trust it
is impossible to envisage how Bitcoin could have achieved its
meteoric rise, nor how other implementations of blockchain
will be adopted let alone be sustainable or achieve their promise.
This study has highlighted perceptions of interpersonal trust
within the Bitcoin ecosystem, how events such as loss can
impact trust and how design decisions can not only facilitate
that loss but also be harnessed to mitigate against potential
mistrust. Whilst we acknowledge that such trust is both
context and application dependent, given the commonality
of the underlying blockchain technology, we expect similar
aspects of interpersonal trust to be significant within future
implementations of blockchain.
With this in mind, design choices being made at the time
of development of similar socio-technical systems are likely
to have consequences upon the trust that users have in those
systems—the less a user finds a system trustworthy, the less
likely they are to adopt and use it. Based on our study of
Bitcoin as the prototypical blockchain, we have distilled four
guidelines for design of blockchain based system and design
considerations that can help engender trust and hence adoption.
Our study is a first step towards understanding in whom, why
and how trust is placed by users of blockchain-based systems
as an active part of the functional requirements definition in
an effort to facilitate adoption. Further research is needed on
other large-scale blockchain-based systems as they emerge to
validate, refine and extend our proposed guidelines. Research
is also needed to probe key properties of the blockchain
implementation – for example, the choice of consensus protocol
– to measure the impact upon user trust, and, in turn impact
upon ongoing participation.
Overall we conclude that trustless is a loaded term not well
understood and often misinterpreted to mean that there is no
notion of trust in blockchain-based systems. Whilst at their
core, such systems may rely upon computation for trust, the
day to day operation is dependent upon human aspects of
trust that software engineers must take into account during the
design of such systems.
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APPENDIX
ABRIDGED SURVEY QUESTIONS
Construct: Propensity to Trust - NEO-PI-R
• Regarding the intentions of others I am rather cynical and
sceptical
• I believe that you will be used by most people if you allow
them to
• I believe that most people have good intentions
• I believe that most people with whom I have dealings are honest
and trustworthy
• I become distrustful when someone does me a favour
• My first reaction is to trust people
• I tend to assume the best of others
• I have a good deal of trust in human nature
Construct: Sentiment Towards Bitcoin
• Long term (3 years +) bitcoin prices will always rise
• Long term adoption by retailers will be good for Bitcoin
• Governments will regulate Bitcoin
• Bitcoin provides a viable alternative to traditional fiat (currency)
• Long term bitcoin offers a better financial return (as an
investment) than stocks
• Bitcoin is primarily a tool for criminal activity
Demographics
1) Where in the world do you Live?
2) Is English your primary language?
3) What is your primary language?
4) How good do you consider your English to be?
5) How old are you?
6) Which gender do you most identify yourself with?
7) Is this the same gender you had at birth?
8) Please indicate the highest level of education completed.
9) Employment - Do you see yourself primarily as...
Bitcoin (Condensed Format)
1) Roughly, when did you first hear about Bitcoin?
2) Can you remember from where you first heard about Bitcoin?
3) How much do you agree with the following statements about
Bitcoin? (includes sentiment towards Bitcoin responses)
4) How well do these statements describe you? (includes self-rated
expertise in Bitcoin responses)
5) What have you used bitcoin for?
6) Can you rank your uses of bitcoin in order of importance to
you?
7) You said you have used bitcoin for investment / speculation;
what position do you currently have?
8) Have you ever lost bitcoin? How?
9) Thinking about when you lost bitcoin, did this affect your trust?
